

within a *Servicio* can be achieved only when the organizational structure is so defined that all employees have a clear understanding of their responsibility and authority, including their administrative "chain of command." It is extremely important that the chief of party give impartial and adequate supervision and con-

sultation to Institute and national personnel responsible for each type of activity. It is also important that the members of the field party keep the chief informed of developments in their programs, particularly if these developments are likely to have implications which would affect the total *Servicio* program.



10-year evaluation of the Bilateral Health Programs, Institute of Inter-American Affairs

The Servicio as an Administrative Device

EVALUATION of the *Servicio* as an administrative device for implementing the cooperative health and sanitation programs in Latin America necessarily took into account both the advantages and the disadvantages of this arrangement. No contention was made, however, that other administrative arrangements might not have served as well.

The characteristics of the *Servicio* considered advantageous include its continuous existence, its official status as an administrative unit of the host government, its large amount of freedom, from administrative controls of both the host government and the United States Government, and its stability. Thus, the *Servicio* provides an operational framework for technical assistance, facilitates the translation of plans into action, contributes to the training of nationals in technical skills, provides a base for indirect assistance to ministries other than the one in which it is established, and offers an opportunity for training nationals in general administration.

An Organizational Framework

Since the *Servicio* is an actual administrative unit of the host country, the technicians arriving from the United States have an established base of operations, with facilities for office space, clerical assistance, supplies, telephones, and related supplies and services. Of even greater importance is the fact that the *Servicios*

have existed in most countries as a stable unit of government for 10 years, thus permitting the establishment and maintenance of lines of communication and contact between *Servicio* personnel and all other officials and offices of the host government.

A large body of knowledge exists within the *Servicio* personnel regarding the operations of the host government which may affect the work of the *Servicio*. Knowledge of local protocol and of the methods and channels to be followed for the most expeditious application of the technical skills represented in the field party is preserved, even though the personnel of the field party changes.

Official Status

Opportunity for accomplishment of objectives by the field party is greatly enhanced by the official status accorded the *Servicio*. Such status opens many doors and makes available many operational facilities which otherwise would not be, at least without time-consuming negotiations.

As an official part of the national ministry, the *Servicio*, under the direction of the chief of field party, is in a position to carry out an operational program. Thus, once the minister and the chief of field party have agreed upon a program, the skills of the technical personnel may be applied to demonstrations under controlled conditions. Operational decisions may

be made largely without regard to political considerations. With the administrative direction of the program under the direct control of the technical group, it is possible to avoid many costly, time-consuming, and faulty operational decisions which are inevitable if responsibility rests with an untrained or inexperienced administrator. This factor was important in all countries early in the program and is still of paramount importance in many countries.

Special Operational Facility

In the agreements between the United States and each Latin American country in which *Servicios* have been established, there are provisions which make it possible for the *Servicios* to operate in a preferential setting. The authority of the chief of party to approve projects and put them into operation without prior clearance with the Institute makes possible the rapid translation of plans into action. At the same time, the *Servicio* is largely freed from the administrative controls and "redtape" of both the host government and the United States Government.

In many Latin American governments, procurement procedures are extremely involved. It is usually necessary to prepare a series of documents in multiple copies and to have them approved by a host of officials. More often than not, this process requires the final signature of the minister in order to procure anything from a postage stamp to a shipload of construction supplies. Many of the procurement procedures of the United States Government are only slightly less involved. The *Servicios* are in large degree freed from such procedures by the provisions of the basic agreements. As a result, they are able to secure supplies and transform work plans into action with a promptness previously unknown to most governmental agencies.

Most basic agreements also give the *Servicios* a high degree of autonomy with regard to personnel practices, accounting and recordkeeping, and other administrative activities. Thus, the *Servicio* can adopt or demonstrate the advantages of practices of the host government in fields which are appropriate.

Continuous Operation

The fact that the *Servicio* was not conceived as a short term "study and report" type of operation has proved to be advantageous in several respects. Over a period of years, the technical personnel can develop a considerable body of knowledge regarding the peculiar health problems, as well as the broad socioeconomic and political characteristics, of the particular country to which they are assigned. Because of the continuous operation of the *Servicio* in most countries, there is no break in the acquisition of this important background knowledge, and newly assigned technical staff may be readily oriented.

In the archives of Latin American government at all levels, as in the United States, are many studies and reports, perhaps well conceived and presented, which contain recommendations never put into effect. There are, of course, many reasons why sound recommendations never reach the execution stage, such as lack of adequate appropriations, an uninitiated legislative body, or opposition of interests within or without the government. But one outstanding reason is that the persons to whom the recommendations are directed often do not know how to go about initiating the changes suggested. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that a large part of the success and popularity of the *Servicio* has been due to the fact that in actual operation it has provided dramatic demonstrations and has developed impact programs instead of making recommendations and leaving them to inexperienced, and to a large extent untrained, officials to carry out.

Characteristics of a locality often require the adaptation of tried methods—physical, social, economic, or political. Too often the technician in a survey-and-report operation is unable to perceive the adaptations necessary, with the result that the entire report is jeopardized in the minds of the local persons to whom it is directed.

In contrast, the *Servicio* operation allows the technician to make his "report" in the form of an actual demonstration project, with regional characteristics taken into account and with the collaboration of the national officials. Thus, the technician may adapt his acquired skills

and knowledges as operations dictate and submit a "final report" in the form of an operating service. Moreover, the nationals who have participated in the planning and execution of such a project are familiar with the project's goals and with its technical operation.

Training of Nationals

An important part of any technical assistance program is the providing of scholarships and travel grants for study in foreign countries. The *Servicios* utilize this practice with a high degree of success. As part of the host government, the *Servicio* is in position to evaluate the qualifications of applicants for such training. Equally as important, *Servicio* personnel are in a position to appraise in advance the opportunities that the national, once trained, will have to utilize his training in the services of his country. The *Servicio* itself provides an operating program to which many trainees return for the first application of their newly acquired skills.

In addition to contributing to the formal training program, the *Servicio* provides an opportunity for inservice training of Latin Americans. For example, when *Servicios* were established in many countries, few if any Latin American sanitary engineers were available. The *Servicio*, therefore, employed civil engineers or persons with engineering training or experience. They were given work assignments under the supervision of the field party's sanitary engineers in the design and construction of water supply and sewerage systems and on malaria control and other public health engineering projects. Thus, they received specialized training during the course of their work. The *Servicio*, by the nature of its structure and function, makes this type of training an effective contribution to the cooperative program.

A Base for Indirect Assistance

Whether a *Servicio* program is carried out as a demonstration project or as an impact program, actual operations and administrative direction rests within the *Servicio*. Therefore, technicians serving in a consultative capacity to

another ministry or unit of government may be assigned to the *Servicio* field party. By having the *Servicio* as a base of operations, such a consultant operates in a preferential setting as compared with the consultant having no previously established base of operation and lacking the official status of the *Servicio* personnel.

Since the *Servicio* functions as a part of the government of the host country and is closely associated with the operations of other branches of that government, the technicians of the *Servicio* are in a good position to judge where grants-in-aid may be made effectively. Certainly, it would appear that where the grant-in-aid is used in a technical assistance program, the guidance of on-the-spot field party personnel would be imperative.

The *Servicio*, by reason of its unusual freedom of action, is in a position to make studies and conduct research programs either as a part of its own program planning or as aid to other units of government. Such research has the advantage of intimate knowledge of the relevant factors within the country and of close cooperation between the *Servicio* and other governmental and private agencies in the country.

A Stable Base

The relative instability and frequent change of governments in some Latin American countries constitute a factor which has demanded serious consideration by both government and private industry in their relationships with these countries. The *Servicios* have proved to be a stable base of operations for the technical assistance program, subject to minimum effect by political change in the host country.

The written basic contract under which the *Servicio* operates, with its great prestige as an international agreement, has been honored without exception by all governments, whether they have come to power by election or otherwise. When there is a change in government or a change in the ministry of health, which in some countries is quite frequent, the previously agreed upon technical cooperation program continues until the new government or the new minister becomes sufficiently oriented

to plan new projects with the chief of field party. It is true that in some instances a new minister may change the emphasis of a program, but observation has led to the conclusion that changes in the chief of party have had more apparent effect upon changing the emphasis of the cooperative program than have changes in the host government. The popularity of the *Servicios*' programs have often led to the indorsement of their activities by all political factions, or at least to the elimination of their activities from discussion in political campaigns.

Training in General Administration

The opportunity which exists in the *Servicio* for the training of nationals in many aspects of general administration is one of the strong positive factors in favor of the type of administrative arrangement it represents.

Experience has clearly demonstrated that successful development of a health program cannot be accomplished by the development of skills in the field of medicine and engineering alone. Basic principles of general administration must be developed in any government before highly technical skills in such fields as health, education, or agriculture can attain the desired ends. The *Servicio* as an operating agency under the direction of, or greatly influenced by, the chief of field party offers an excellent base for demonstrating techniques in personnel administration, financial administration, procurement, and control of property, and orderly office management. Through the business manager and other members of the field party it should be possible to assist the ministries to improve their practices in these fields. This would go a long way toward assuring continued operation of *Servicio* programs at a reasonable level of competence after they are turned over to the ministries.

Problems of Responsible Administration

It is a generally recognized principle of administration that divided authority and responsibility for the operation of a program usually lead to confusion, irresponsibility, and

failure to achieve the desired results. The cooperative program by its very nature implies that the ultimate responsibility and authority for it rest with two sovereign governments. This problem has been met primarily by the delegation of authority and responsibility for program planning and operation in each country to the chiefs of field party in that country. The host governments agreed to the designation of the chiefs of field party as the directors of the *Servicios*, and in practice they have delegated practically complete operational responsibility to them. Thus, the chief of field party of each *Servicio* may put a program into action when he obtains the concurrence of the minister of health on specific projects, so long as it falls within the general framework of the bilateral agreement. Although project agreements do not require prior approval by the Institute, they are reviewed by it for form and legal commitments which may be involved.

The mere delegation of authority to the chiefs of field party does not completely solve the problem of dual responsibility, although it has unquestionably done much to facilitate operations.

The chief of field party has considerable prestige in most of the Latin American countries. He is an official representative of the United States Government. In some cases his salary is higher than that of the highest paid national government official. He has a considerable budget at his disposal, with few of the checks and controls imposed upon other operating officials in either country. In some countries, because the *Servicio* has demonstrated comparatively high efficiency, it has been asked to assume the role of purchasing and importing agent for other sections of the host government. This activity requires the handling of considerable sums of money in addition to the *Servicio* funds and not subject to the same control and audit as are the *Servicio* funds.

All these factors make it clearly impractical for the Institute to delegate completely its responsibility for the *Servicio*'s operations and necessitate a bifurcated administration by the two governments involved. They also emphasize the absolute necessity of having outstanding administrators as chiefs of field party.

Inherent in the administration of the *Ser-*

vicios is the danger that they will develop into governmental institutions interested in self-perpetuation and lose sight of the fact that their existence is solely for the purpose of assisting a national government in strengthening existing units of government or in developing new units, all of which are to be fitted eventually into a unified and harmonious national governmental operation in a particular field of endeavor. Since the *Servicio* operates in a pref-

erential setting, it is much easier for it to develop and maintain specific health services at a high level of efficiency than it is for most units of a national government. Because of an understandable pride of accomplishment and a reluctance to see the developed services undergo any unfavorable change, there has been a tendency to continue the programs and facilities under the auspices of the *Servicio* for longer periods than would appear to be desirable.

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In considering the advantages and disadvantages of the Servicio as an administrative device, the evaluators reached the conclusion that, although full use has not been made of its positive administrative potential, not many of the negative possibilities have materialized to an extent to cause serious concern regarding the technique. They agreed that over a period of

years the Servicio has worked, and worked well, and that the programs undertaken through this type of organization have been unquestionably highly successful. They concurred in the view that certainly no other type of administrative organization has been as thoroughly tested over such a period of time and in such a setting and found to be so successful.

United Nations Day

October 24 has been designated as United Nations Day by Presidential proclamation.

President Eisenhower urged the citizens of the Nation to observe the day by "sending messages to friends, relatives, and associates in other member countries of the United Nations, by learning more about the United Nations and its members, and by expressing their confidence in the United Nations, their friendship for other peoples, and their faith in the ultimate triumph of peace and justice through the efforts of men of good will."

He also called upon "officials of the Federal, State, and local governments, the United States Committee for United Nations Day, representatives of civic, educational, and religious organizations, agencies of the press, radio, television, motion pictures, and other communications media, and all citizens to cooperate in appropriate observance of this day throughout the country."

The proclamation pointed out that the United Nations provides the peoples of the world with an organization through which international differences in the economic and political fields can be peacefully resolved; that the need for the United Nations is greater than ever before, and that its success depends on the extent to which its members give it support.